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Abstract
This paper examines whether female East-West migrants in Germany after the
reunication face an additional disadvantage after they move compared to both
stayers and males. It employs panel data techniques to take account of unobserved
heterogeneity. I nd that migrant women after migration neither experience a drop
in relative employment, nor earn lower relative hourly wages. They do, however,
work relatively less hours and have a lower relative annual income. The results also
suggest that for them, the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect and they
substitute market work with home production, in particular with childcare.
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Gender di¤erences among migrants are often more substantial than among the local pop-
ulation in general. Boyd (1984) postulates that "...in addition to the status of being a mi-
grant, immigrant women experience additional di¢ culties in the labor force as women..."
(p. 1092). Empirical studies have investigated whether immigrant women face a so-
called "double disadvantage" of being both a female and a foreign-born with respect to
labor force participation and employment (Rebhun, 2006, De Jong and Madamba, 2001,
Raijman and Semyonov, 1997, Boyd, 1984, Kats, 1982), wages (De Jong and Madamba,
2001, Haberfeld, 1993, Kossoudji and Ranney, 1984), occupational status and job mobility
(Raijman and Semyonov, 1997, Boyd, 1984) and job mismatch (De Jong and Madamba,
2001). All of them analyze female immigrantslabor market status in the receiving coun-
try, comparing them to males and to native females.
On the other hand, understanding how female migrants perform relative to stayers
is crucial in order to complete the picture. A parallel question of interest is: Do female
migrants experience a gain in their relative labor market outcomes after migration, or do
they experience a (double) disadvantage with respect to their male counterparts as well
as the sending countrys population? This paper attempts to answer this question.
Neoclassical theory of migration postulates that migration occurs if the present dis-
counted value of the lifetime income stream in the destination region, net of migration
costs, is higher than the one in the source region. Migrants are often viewed as being
positively self-selected with respect to the sending country population, and thus, on av-
erage, being more likely to engage in labor market activities and to earn higher wages
in the receiving country. However, family migration models (starting with Mincer, 1978)
emphasize that the decision to move is a joint decision by the family and women are
typically viewed as "tied" movers. Being tied to their husbands they do not necessarily
experience a gain from migration. Family investment models, on the other hand, postu-
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late that, willing to maximize the joint returns to migration, married female migrants in
the early stage of emigration engage in labor market activities and are the main income
earners, while their husbands invest in the human capital of the host country and are
expected to contribute to the family budget later on (Duleep and Dowhan, 2002, Baker
and Benjamin, 1997, Duleep and Sanders, 1993).
A second contribution of this paper is that it analyzes gender and migration in the
context of the transition economy of East Germany, which is becoming an increasingly
relevant issue in light of the recent EU enlargements and European East-West migration.
In East Germany, a so-called "sex blindness" policies applied under communism with labor
force participation of women being high (more than 80 percent). It remained relatively
high also after the reunication (72 percent in May 2000) (Bonin and Euwals, 2005).
However, their employment fell more than that of men, and the gender wage gap has
narrowed due to the exit from employment of low skilled women (Hunt, 2002). At the
same time, fertility declined (Lechner, 2001), as did the availability of childcare facilities,
which is, however, still larger in eastern than in western Germany (Wrohlich, 2004).
Finally, the majority of migrants from East to West Germany were women (see Figure 1).
This paper describes the labor market performance of female migrants from East to
West Germany over 1990 - 2001, a decade after the reunication, comparing them both
to stayers and males. It documents the relation between being both a female and a
migrant and four outcomes of interest: annual income, employment, hours worked per
week and hourly earnings. It uses the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which is
a longitudinal dataset that contains information on both pre- and post- migration histories
of migrants as well as information on stayers. Given that there are both pre- and post- data
available for the same individuals, I use a sort of "di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erence"
approach. Having panel data also allows di¤erencing away time-invariant unobservable
confounders. Thus, to the extent that self-selection into migration is inuenced by time-
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invariant unobservables, this approach identies a causal e¤ect of being a female migrant
on labor market performance.
The main results of this study are as follows. I nd that migrant women after migration
neither experience a drop in relative employment, nor earn lower relative hourly wages,
compared to the change in relative outcomes of stayers. They do, however, work fewer
hours and have a lower relative annual income. The results also suggest that engaging
in childcare activities, having a husband in the West or a partner with a higher income
contribute to the explanation of this e¤ect, indicating that female migrants in the West
seem to substitute some market work with home production, in particular childcare. This
negative e¤ect is most likely attributable to the combination of both demand factors
on the one hand, such as availability of part-time vacancies in the West, and supply
factors on the other hand, such as reduced labor supply due to the childcare activities
and insu¢ ciency of childcare institutions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
presents descriptive evidence. Section 3 outlines econometric methodology and discusses
the results. Some explanations are suggested in section 4, section 5 explores migration
within western German states, and section 6 provides a robustness analysis. Section 7
concludes.
2 Data and descriptive evidence
The paper exploits 1990-2001 waves of the eastern sample of the German Socio-Economic
Panel survey (GSOEP).1 In the GSOEP, eastern Germans are traced if they move to
western Germany. Thus, the main advantage of this dataset is that it has both pre- and
post-migration information for the same individuals, while a small number of observations
1See SOEP Group (2001) for a description of the dataset.
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for movers constitutes the main disadvantage.
The outcomes of interest are constructed as follows. The total annual individual in-
come is a sum of individual earnings from the main job, second job and self-employment,
and the social security benets (such as unemployment benets, maternity benets etc.).
The mean income is set to missing only if information on all the components is miss-
ing.2 Employment is a dummy that equals one if an individual is working, and is zero
otherwise. Hours per week are reported hours worked per week. Finally, hourly earnings
are calculated as monthly earnings (wages and salaries from main job, second job and
self-employment) divided by the number of hours worked per week, further divided by
4.3.3 All nancial variables are inated to 2001 by regional CPIs and are expressed in
DM.
The migrants group includes all persons that experienced migration during 1990-
2001, and the stayersgroup comprises those who stayed in the East during 1990-2001. I
concentrate on working age individuals (18-54 years old) for whom the data on the key
variables are not missing.4 Final sample sizes vary with the dependent variables used
and range from 18,126 to 8,984 observations, 425-1,169 of whom belong to the migration
group (actual and potential migrants).5
Table 1 provides socioeconomic characteristics for migrants and stayers by gender for
the periods "before" and "after".6 As can be seen from this table, migrants on average
are younger and are less likely to be married than stayers both "before" and "after". The
2I also exclude the obvious outliers from the sample, i.e. individuals whose average annual income is
less than 1,000 DM or greater than 130,000 DM.
3I also exclude the outliers, i.e. those earning less than 100 DM or more than 20,000 DM per month.
4The upper bound of age is chosen due to the early retirement schemes. Individuals in full-time
education and military service as well as return migrants are excluded. I also exclude commuters from
stayers, since they constitute a specic group, but keep them in the robustness checks. Finally, I keep
only those for whom the data is observed for both "before" and "after" periods.
5In the sample, around 6 percent are migrants. This number is consistent with the aggregate gures.
6Note that for the analysis below I have to dene pre- and post- periods also for stayers. I dene
1990-1995 as a "pre-" period, and 1996-2001 as a "post-" period. While this denition is somewhat
arbitrary, the main results hold also with di¤erent year thresholds.
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proportion of both male and female migrants with university degree is almost the same
as that of stayers "before", although this proportion is much higher for migrants after
migration, with male migrants on average being more educated than females. Since not
all human capital acquired in the East is transferrable to the West, it seems that migrants
do invest in their human capital in the West.
Table 2 presents labor force behavior for males and females. The pooled data reveals
that there are fewer unemployed among male migrants than among stayers after migration,
however this trend does not hold for migrant women, with 95 percent of males and 75
percent of females being employed after migration. Large di¤erences between genders
exist in part-time work before and after migration: while 7 percent of female migrants
work part-time before move (18 percent of female stayers and 3 percent of male migrants
do so), the proportion increases to 40 percent after they move (compared to 18 percent of
female stayers and virtually 0 percent of male migrants). Table 2 shows also occupational
distribution of males and females before and after migration. Females, both stayers and
migrants before and after the move, tend to be concentrated in the technician and associate
professional jobs, the second largest group being service and sales workers. Males are
concentrated in craft, construction and related trades occupations, the second largest
group being plant and machinery operators. There seems to exist no descriptive evidence
of the downward occupational mobility after migration.
Tables 1 and 2 display also the outcomes of interest. A number of features are worth
noting. First, Table 1 shows that the annual income of male migrants after migration
is much higher than their initial income before migration, and is also higher than the
income of stayers. The income of females, however, does not follow this trend: in the
period after migration, the annual income of female migrants seems to be even lower
than the annual income of female stayers. Second, while the di¤erences in employment
and hourly wages in all groups are not large before migration (with the exception of
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employment for males), they become obvious after migration with male migrants working
more and female migrants working less than stayers (see Table 2). Third, there is a
striking di¤erence in hours worked between migrant men and women (Table 2): while
before migration migrants and stayers have an almost equal amount of hours worked
per week (with males on average working roughly 5 hours more than females), after the
move, the average number of hours increases for migrant men from 46.49 to 46.70, but
drops for women from 41.41 to 32.80, and the proportion of migrant women working
part-time increases from 7 percent to 40 percent. Fourth, both male and female migrants
earn higher hourly wages than stayers after migration, and the gender pay gap exists
for migrants both before and after migration (Table 1). Finally, it is worth noting that
overall there exist some systematic di¤erences in outcomes of migrants and stayers even
before migration occurs. It is possible that the endogeneity of migration decision generates
these di¤erences, or that they are due to di¤erences in observable characteristics between
migrants and stayers. These issues are addressed in the following section.
Before controlling for observed heterogeneity, however, it is also useful to undertake
another descriptive exercise and to compare the di¤erences in means between migrants
and stayers by gender (a sort of "di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erence" exercise). Table 3
illustrates these unadjusted estimates. Each panel compares the change in the respective
outcome along three dimensions of variation. The rst is the comparison of the periods
before and after migration, the second di¤erence is between migrants and stayers, and the
third one is between men and women. Each cell contains the mean average outcome for
the group labeled on the axes, along with the standard errors. Does the di¤erentiation
of the labor force by sex and mobility status operate to the "double disadvantage" of
migrant women? The answer appears to be "yes" in terms of annual income, employment
and hours worked per week. However, this does not seem to be the case for hourly wages
- there is a fall in relative hourly earnings of female migrants compared to the change in
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relative hourly earnings of stayers, however it is not signicant. This descriptive exercise
provides some evidence that female migrants face a decrease in certain labor market
outcomes relative to male migrants and stayers after they move. However, the causal
interpretation of this e¤ect is problematic, since there exist important observable and
unobservable characteristics that confound it. The econometric analysis below addresses
these issues.
3 Regression framework and estimation results
Table 3 does not control for the observed heterogeneity between the groups, such as human
capital and demographics. The regression equation that controls for these observable
characteristics has the following form:
Yi;t = 1(Fi Mi  At) + 2(Fi Mi) + 3(Fi  At) + 4(Mi  At) + (1)
+5Mi + 6Fi + 7At + Xi;t + t + "i;t
where Yi;t is the outcome variable of individual i in year t, Fi indicates if an individual
i is a female, Mi indicates if she belongs to the migrantsgroup, At is a dummy that
equals 1 for the period "after" and is 0 otherwise, Xi;t is a vector of control variables,
t are year xed e¤ects, and "i;t is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated with other
variables.
The coe¢ cient 1 on the third-level interaction is our parameter of interest. It captures
all variation in labor market outcomes specic to migrants (relative to stayers) to females
(relative to males) in the years after migration (relative to before). The second-level
interactions control for time-invariant characteristics of the migrant females (2), changes
over time for all females (3), and changes over time for the migrantsgroup (4). Finally,
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the migrant dummy controls for any time-invariant characteristics of the migrants (5),
female dummy - for time-invariant characteristics of females (6), and "after" dummy -
for the time-series changes in outcomes.
Tables 4-7 present the estimation results for di¤erent outcomes.7 In all tables column
(1) reports the estimates from an OLS regression without controls, column (2) adds stan-
dard controls such as age and its square, marital status, number of children less than 14
years old, education, blue-collar and public sector employment dummies, year and region
xed e¤ects, and column (3) adds a lagged hourly wage as a proxy for skills. Further
columns include additional controls and pre-determined covariates. Finally, in the last
columns I also control for individual xed e¤ects.8
Do female migrants after migration experience a signicant income loss relative to
males and stayers? The rst row of Table 4 presents the estimate of the e¤ect on the
annual income. As can be seen from this table, the answer appears to be yes. The e¤ect
holds with the addition of controls, and even the xed e¤ects estimation indicates that
female migrants face a signicant 24-32 percent drop in relative annual income after they
move on top of the e¤ects for all migrants and all females.
Other coe¢ cients are also worth noting. Fixed e¤ects estimation results show that the
e¤ect for all migrants after they move relative to stayers is positive and economically and
statistically signicant. There exist no robust evidence for the e¤ect for all females in the
period "after". Neither the time-invariant e¤ect for female migrants nor the migration
dummy is statistically signicant. Females receive lower annual income than males. The
coe¢ cients on the other covariates are as expected9: experience has a concave prole,
7Note that sample size changes when lagged hourly earnings and pre-determined controls are included,
however, the main results hold in spite of the changes in composition. To compare the e¤ect, columns
with the same number of observations have to be considered.
8Note that if unobservables are not time-invariant and are positively correlated with the probability
to move, the estimation results are biased upwards and constitute the "upper bound" of the true e¤ect.
9available upon request.
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university graduates earn higher annual income, those with a general schooling degree
receive lower income relative to apprentices, public sector employees have higher income,
and the coe¢ cient on the lagged wage is positive and signicant. Thus, even after having
controlled for skills and individual xed e¤ects, the relative e¤ect for female migrants on
annual income remains negative and highly signicant.
Table 5 shows analogous estimates for employment probabilities. In contrast to annual
income, female migrants do not face signicantly lower relative employment probability
after they move. The e¤ect changes sign, however remains statistically insignicant across
all specications, with the exception of OLS(1) and OLS(3). The positive and signicant
e¤ect of migrants after migration disappears in the xed e¤ects estimation, but all females
in the period "after" seem to have higher relative probability of being employed (in six
out of eight specications). Employment prospects seem to worsen over time, and both
coe¢ cients on time-invariant migrant and female dummies are negative and signicant
in the majority of specications. Coe¢ cients on age, marital status, number of children,
schooling and lagged wage have the expected signs.
Table 6 presents the results for hours worked per week.10 If being a female migrant
does not inuence the relative employment outcome after migration, it does appear to
inuence the relative weekly hours worked. The coe¢ cient on the third-level interaction is
negative and statistically signicant in all model specications. Moreover, the magnitude
of the e¤ect diminishes only slightly with the inclusion of additional controls: female
migrants experience a 22-27 percent decrease in relative weekly hours worked after they
move. Moreover, the coe¢ cient on the second-level interaction female  after is also
negative and statistically signicant, indicating that in the period "after" all females
face a drop in their weekly working hours. Finally, a negative and signicant coe¢ cient
10These are hours worked conditional on being employed. Note that due to the high labor force
participation of females in East Germany, the selection into the labor force problem can be ignored here.
Labor supply and wages can be modelled jointly, however, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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on female dummy indicates that, in general, females work less hours relative to males.
The coe¢ cients on all other controls have the expected signs. Overall, even after having
controlled for skills and individual xed e¤ects, the relative e¤ect for female migrants on
hours worked remains negative and highly signicant.
Finally, Table 7 presents estimation results for hourly earnings. As can be seen from
this table, there exists no additional e¤ect of being a female migrant on hourly wages (the
only exception is OLS(2)). Coe¢ cients on the second-level interaction female after is
positive and signicant in all specications but one, indicating a 3-6 percent increase in
the relative hourly wages of females in the period "after". The gender wage gap, however,
exists with females earning on average 7-16 percent less than males. The remaining
coe¢ cients are as expected: experience has a concave prole, university graduates earn
more relative to apprentices, blue-collar workers earn less than white-collar employees and
public sector employees have higher hourly earnings.
Overall, the regression analysis indicates that there exists an additional negative e¤ect
for female migrants after migration on their annual incomes and hours worked, but not
on employment likelihood and hourly earnings.
4 Searching for explanations
So far, we have established that compared to stayers and male migrants, female migrants in
the West face a drop in their relative weekly working hours and annual incomes. Migrant
women seem to switch to part-time work after migration, and thus receive a lower relative
annual income. But is this e¤ect equally distributed across all female migrants? Is it a
voluntary choice or a disadvantage, preferences or demand? It is di¢ cult to disentangle
true preferences, and the analysis below attempts to at least suggest some potential
answers.
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Table 8 shows the e¤ect for di¤erent groups indicated in each row. For example, when
the e¤ect is estimated for a subpopulation of married individuals (see the rst panel), it
is still negative and signicant. The same holds for the subpopulation of married with
children (second panel), married before migration (third panel) and for those with children
before migration (fourth panel). On the other hand, when the estimations are made for
a subpopulation of singles, the e¤ect becomes insignicant. Thus, fertility and marriage
constitute potential explanations of the negative e¤ect. In addition, potential endogeneity
does not seem to be a problem, since the additional negative e¤ect is present conditioning
on being married or having children before migration, as well as on having worked before
migration.
These ndings indicate several interesting facts. First, the results in Table 8 suggest
that the e¤ect is heterogenous across di¤erent demographic groups. Second, the group
that experience an additional negative e¤ect on the supply of working hours and on annual
income is the one consisting of married female migrants after migration (with or without
children). For singles, being a female and a migrant inuences their relative labor market
outcomes insignicantly. Thus, family background matters, and merits a more detailed
exploration.
Could family characteristics explain this additional negative e¤ect of being a female
migrant on relative annual income and weekly hours? Table 9 provides an answer. In this
table, I have reestimated the baseline model in equation (1) including the additional in-
teractions of the e¤ect (FiMiAt) with other variables. If it is true that these variables
reinforce the e¤ect for female migrants, we should see a signicant coe¢ cient on these
additional interactions and 1 should either decrease in magnitude or become insigni-
cant.11 Indeed, the rst panel of Table 9 indicates that the marital status contributes
to the explanation. The interaction with the spouse dummy is negative and statistically
11This exercise is similar to the one in Ichino et al. (2006).
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signicant for both annual income and hours worked, while the (Fi Mi  At) dummy
becomes insignicant. Having children younger than 14 years old and being a female
migrant has an e¤ect on the relative annual income, but the impact is insignicant for
hours worked after migration. On the other hand, there seems to be no additional e¤ect
from already having a spouse before migration.12 In addition, spending time for child-
care contributes signicantly to the explanation of the e¤ect on hours supplied, and the
(Fi  Mi  At) dummy becomes either insignicant or smaller in magnitude. Finally,
the income of other household members also contributes signicantly to the explanation
of this e¤ect:13 a higher partners (or other household members) income signicantly
reduces the relative annual income and hours worked for female migrants after migration,
while the (FiMiAt) e¤ect again becomes either insignicant or smaller in magnitude.
This exercise suggests that family background is indeed a potential reason behind a
negative relative e¤ect for migrant women: having a husband, having a higher income
of other members of the household, and spending time for childcare is associated with
working less hours and receiving a lower annual individual income. In contrast, being
married already before migration does not have any additional e¤ect on the outcomes of
interest. Migrant women who have a spouse in the West or who live in "rich" households
reduce their supply of labor market hours. Since the wage rate increases after migration
(see Table 1), it appears that the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect for
these females. After migration, they may switch either to more leisure, or to household
production including childcare. Indeed, since spending time for childcare has a separate
negative e¤ect for these females, it implies that childcare is another potential explanation.
12"Married before" dummy is equal to 1 if an individual was married one year before and in the year
of migration.
13This variable is constructed as the di¤erence between monthly household income and monthly income
of an individual i in year t: I also experimented with individual partners income, although the sample
size dropped signicantly. While the results were qualitatively the same, my preferred variable is the
income of other household members.
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Since the availability of childcare facilities is better in East Germany than in the West14,
and since relatives, who could potentially contribute to the childcare activities, are usually
left in the East, at the margin, female migrants substitute their market work in the West
with childcare. The opportunity costs of home production seem to be higher for female
migrants. On the other hand, they may also face an increased availability of the part-time
jobs in the West that were not available in the East, or, conversely, a decreased demand
for full-time jobs. Overall, the negative relative e¤ect on working hours and incomes is
most likely to be due to the combination of both supply and demand factors. A decreased
availability of childcare facilities combined with the decreased demand for full-time jobs
point towards the involuntary choice as the most likely explanation.
5 The e¤ect in western Germany
One remaining question that has to be addressed is whether the double negative e¤ect
found above is specic for transition economies or does it also hold in other contexts?
This section provides an answer and, to this aim, examines the relation between having a
female migrant status and four labor market outcomes of interest for the within-western
German migration only.
In order to be consistent with the analysis above, I have tried to follow closely deni-
tions and sample selection rules. In particular, the four labor market outcomes of interest
are dened as in Section 2, and the time period is the same: 1990-2001. The denition
of migrants, however, changes, since now migrants include those individuals who change
their residence from one western German state ("Bundesland") to another over 1990-2001.
I again concentrate on working age individuals (18-54 years old) for whom the data on
14For example, in 1990 there were 54.2 childcare places available per hundred children under the age
of three in East Germany, while there were only 1.8 such places in the West. The number has dropped
for the East and increased slightly for the West, but there are still signicant di¤erences with 36.3 places
and 2.8 places in 1998, respectively (see Wrohlich, 2004).
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the key variables are not missing.15 The nal sample size ranges from 26,378 to 32,377
observations.
Table 10 presents estimation results. As can be seen from this table, female inter-state
migrants in western Germany experience insignicant additional e¤ects with respect to
employment probability and hourly earnings. However, the additional e¤ect on weekly
hours and annual income is, if anything, positive. The xed e¤ects estimation results
suggest that, compared to males and stayers, female migrants after migration have both
higher working hours and higher annual incomes in western Germany.
Thus, this analysis suggests that the additional negative e¤ect on the supply of work-
ing hours and on annual incomes is specic for women who move between regions with
di¤erent institutions, such as East and West Germany, among which childcare facilities
and availability of part-time jobs are important.
6 Sensitivity analysis
In addition to changes in the specication of the baseline model (see Tables 4-7), several
robustness checks were undertaken. Table 11 shows this sensitivity analysis.
First, I have controlled for additional household-level characteristics, such as total
household size and household income (panel A). The xed e¤ects estimation results show
that migrant females after migration experience an additional 24 percent drop both in their
relative annual income and in relative weekly hours worked. Second, in panel B, I have
included detailed controls for occupation (nine occupational groups according to ISCO88
denition). Again, the results were not a¤ected: while the negative e¤ect on income was
15Again, individuals in full-time education and military service as well as return migrants are excluded.
However, inter-state commuters are included in the "stayers" group, since it is not possible to identify
them in the data for West Germany (this is comparable with the robustness checks for the East-West
analysis below). Finally, I keep only those individuals for whom the data is observed for both "before"
and "after" periods.
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24 percent in xed e¤ects estimation, the e¤ect on hours equaled to 26 percent. Finally, to
check how robust the results were to di¤erent denitions of the control group, in panel C,
I have retained commuters in stayersgroup. These are individuals who reside in eastern
Germany and work in western Germany, and for whom the impact of family background
is likely to be more similar to stayers than to migrants. The additional negative e¤ect for
annual income was 24 percent, while the e¤ect for weekly hours equaled to 25 percent.
In all panels, the relative e¤ects for employment and hourly earnings were insignicant.
Overall, the main results remained robust to changes in the denition of the control group
and to the inclusion of additional controls.
7 Conclusions
This paper documented the relative labor market performance of female migrants from
East to West Germany over 1990-2001, comparing them to males and stayers. A sort of
"di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erence" methodology and panel data techniques were used
to purge away time invariant unobservable confounders.
The main results indicate that female East-West migrants after migration experience
an additional negative e¤ect on their relative annual incomes and hours worked, but not
on the relative employment probabilities or hourly wages. This is consistent with standard
labor supply model, and suggests that for these females the income e¤ect dominates the
substitution e¤ect.
Moreover, the negative e¤ect is heterogenous across di¤erent demographic groups and
is not present for single female migrants. The family background thus serves as a potential
explanation, and the results also suggest that having a husband in the West, having a
higher partners income, having children and spending time for childcare indeed contribute
to the explanation of this negative e¤ect. Thus, female migrants in the West seem to
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substitute some market work with home production, in particular with childcare.
Moreover, this additional negative relative e¤ect on working hours and incomes has
demonstrated to be specic to the transition economy structure of East Germany. Overall,
the additional negative e¤ect for East-West female migrants remains robust to changes in
specication and in the sample, and is most likely to be attributable to the combination
of both supply and demand factors.
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8 Appendix
Table 1: Socioeconomic characteristics by gender and mobility status "before" and "after"
Males Females
Stayers Migrants Stayers Migrants
before
Age 36.12 31.79 35.91 31.01
(8.84) (9.39) (8.61) (9.33)
Married 0.71 0.51 0.77 0.49
Number of kids<14 y.o. 1.07 0.83 1.13 1.03
(1.00) (0.98) (0.99) (0.94)
General school 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.20
University 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.09
Other technical or vocational training 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.13
Observations [3670] [196] [4562] [304]
Annual income 39209.18 37921.29 29799.78 29832.13
(17643.66) (21807.53) (17010.30) (22217.62)
Observations [3419] [184] [4206] [274]
Hourly earnings 19.92 19.01 19.02 18.12
(11.95) (11.42) (14.97) (12.23)
Observations [2894] [142] [3008] [184]
after
Age 39.61 37.55 39.63 35.35
(8.72) (8.60) (8.50) (9.22)
Married 0.67 0.64 0.73 0.69
Number of kids<14 y.o. 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.91
(0.94) (0.96) (0.93) (0.90)
General school 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08
University 0.12 0.25 0.08 0.14
Other technical or vocational training 0.25 0.18 0.28 0.24
Observations [3866] [259] [4859] [410]
Annual income 40096.95 57016.90 31943.42 30998.65
(19357.46) (25349.15) (19566.65) (22053.43)
Observations [3339] [228] [4162] [329]
Hourly earnings 20.88 27.87 20.96 25.37
(16.30) (14.34) (19.14) (24.90)
Observations [2765] [215] [3080] [270]
Note: standard deviations in parentheses. "Before" stands for a period before moving West for migrants and before
1996 for stayers, "after" stands for a period after individual move for migrants and after 1996 for stayers. See text for
denitions. Annual income is a sum of labor income and social security benets. Hourly wage includes wages and salaries
from main job, second job and self-employment. All nancial variables are inated to 2001 by regional CPIs and expressed
in DM. Reference categories: single, apprenticeship.
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Table 2: Labor force behavior by gender and mobility status "before" and "after"
Males Females
Stayers Migrants Stayers Migrants
before
Employed 0.90 0.84 0.76 0.73
Blue collar 0.50 0.46 0.17 0.11
Observations [3670] [196] [4562] [304]
Part-time work 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.07
Hours per week 45.19 46.49 40.01 41.41
(9.14) (9.21) (9.02) (7.19)
Observations [3096] [151] [3247] [200]
Occupation (in %):
managers 7.08 7.05 3.66 2.79
professionals 12.10 5.13 13.80 10.70
technicians, assoc. professionals 9.63 7.69 30.37 40.47
clerks 2.99 5.13 17.69 17.67
service, sales workers 4.77 10.26 18.61 17.21
agricultural, shery workers 1.79 1.92 1.59 1.40
craft, construction workers 39.55 23.72 5.25 3.72
machinery operators 14.71 23.72 3.30 0
elementary occupations 7.17 7.69 5.72 6.05
armed forces 0.22 7.69 0 0
after
Employed 0.84 0.95 0.76 0.75
Blue collar 0.46 0.55 0.17 0.13
Observations [3866] [259] [4562] [410]
Part-time work 0.03 0.004 0.18 0.40
Hours per week 45.89 46.70 40.00 32.80
(9.47) (9.35) (9.02) (11.90)
Observations [3153] [239] [3247] [301]
Occupation (in %)
managers 7.29 5.42 3.66 2.07
professionals 12.78 14.17 13.80 11.72
technicians, assoc. professionals 10.48 11.67 30.37 37.24
clerks 3.66 3.75 17.69 18.97
service, sales workers 4.51 1.67 18.61 20.00
agricultural, shery workers 2.56 0.42 1.59 0
craft, construction workers 38.37 29.58 5.25 1.03
machinery operators 12.31 22.92 3.30 4.14
elementary occupations 8.02 9.17 5.72 4.83
armed forces 0.03 1.25 0 0
Note: standard deviations in parentheses. See footnote of Table 1.
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Table 3: Di¤erences in labor market outcomes by gender and mobility status
Before After After - before
Males (1) Females (2) Males (3) Females (4) Males (5) Females (6)
log total annual income
Stayers 10.450 10.104 10.456 10.150 0.006 0.047***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Migrants 10.333 10.006 10.840 9.994 0.508*** -0.011
(0.054) (0.050) (0.034) (0.052) (0.062) (0.073)
M-S -0.117*** -0.098** 0.385*** -0.156*** 0.502*** -0.058




Stayers 0.896 0.759 0.845 0.743 -0.051*** -0.016*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Migrants 0.842 0.727 0.946 0.751 0.104*** 0.024
(0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.021) (0.028) (0.033)
M-S -0.054** -0.032 0.101*** 0.008 0.155*** 0.040




Stayers 3.787 3.656 3.800 3.625 0.013** -0.030***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Migrants 3.818 3.701 3.826 3.394 0.008 -0.307***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.028) (0.020) (0.037)
M-S 0.032 0.046** 0.026 -0.231*** -0.005 -0.277***




Stayers 2.879 2.806 2.907 2.882 0.029** 0.076***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Migrants 2.808 2.666 3.217 2.993 0.409*** 0.327***
(0.045) (0.054) (0.032) (0.039) (0.054) (0.066)
M-S -0.071 -0.140*** 0.310*** 0.111*** 0.380*** 0.251***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.034) (0.035) (0.055) (0.067)
DDD -0.129
(0.087)
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. Cells contain means of the respective labor market outcome. Before / after and
migrants and stayers are dened in the text. DDD is the "di¤erence-in-di¤erence" for females minus that for males. ***
signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant at 10% level.
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Table 4: Estimation results: annual income
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) FE (5) FE (6)
female*migr*after -0.443*** -0.474*** -0.456*** -0.513*** -0.239*** -0.316***
(0.095) (0.082) (0.097) (0.111) (0.074) (0.099)
migr*after 0.057 0.297 0.681*** 0.983*** 0.342*** 0.853***
(0.544) (0.409) (0.042) (0.208) (0.119) (0.325)
female*after 0.019 0.029 -0.010 0.061*** 0.017 0.050***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014)
female*migr -0.089 -0.024 0.004 0.038
(0.071) (0.059) (0.057) (0.078)
after 0.127** 0.006 -0.062 0.005 -0.057* -0.140***
(0.057) (0.050) (0.053) (0.063) (0.035) (0.050)
migr -0.021 0.057 0.033 -0.069
(0.047) (0.039) (0.036) (0.057)
female -0.225*** -0.310*** -0.240*** -0.363***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes No
Controls at t=0 No No No Yes No Yes
Earnings in 1991 No No Yes No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.08 0.31 0.37 0.25 - -
Observations 13119 13119 9244 12854 13119 12854
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant
at 10% level. The dependent variable is the log of individual total annual income (labor income plus social security benets).
Additional controls include age and its square, marital status, number of children less than 14 years old, education, blue-
collar and public sector employment dummies, year and region xed e¤ects. In xed e¤ects (FE) estimation time-invariant
covariates are dropped.
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Table 5: Estimation results: employment
OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4) OLS(5) FE(6) FE(7) FE(8)
female*migr*after -0.106** -0.069 -0.164*** 0.032 -0.082* 0.034 0.039 -0.014
(0.046) (0.045) (0.053) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
migr*after 0.431*** 0.526*** 0.094*** 0.083 0.520*** 0.109 -0.087 0.093
(0.040) (0.039) (0.030) (0.075) (0.041) (0.085) (0.116) (0.059)
female*after 0.035*** 0.021** -0.003 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.008 0.019** 0.030***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
female*migr 0.012 0.033 0.105*** 0.032 0.025
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
after -0.107*** -0.123*** -0.060* -0.100*** -0.112*** -0.088*** -0.077*** -0.100***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
migr -0.075*** -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.047* -0.084***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
female -0.137*** -0.030*** 0.008 -0.006 -0.100***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls at t=0 No No No No Yes No No Yes
Earnings in 1991 No No Yes No No No No No
Othersincome No No No Yes No No Yes No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.03 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.07 - - -
Observations 18126 18126 11464 15990 18126 18126 15990 18126
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant
at 10% level. The dependent variable is a binary employment status of an individual. Additional controls include age and
its square, marital status, number of children less than 14 years old, education, blue-collar dummies, year and region xed
e¤ects. In xed e¤ects (FE) estimation time-invariant covariates are dropped.
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Table 6: Estimation results: weekly hours
OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4) OLS(5) FE(6) FE(7) FE(8)
female*migr*after -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.266*** -0.220*** -0.233*** -0.245*** -0.246*** -0.264***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.053) (0.041) (0.047) (0.053) (0.056) (0.055)
migr*after 0.329*** 0.310*** -0.071 0.219*** 0.266*** 0.152** -0.143 0.144**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.053) (0.041) (0.044) (0.077) (0.105) (0.074)
female*after -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.020** -0.043*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
female*migr 0.003 0.001 -0.015 -0.008 0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027)
after 0.006 0.006 0.028 0.007 0.015 0.004 0.002 0.013
(0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
migr 0.036* 0.044** 0.045* 0.046** 0.014
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
female -0.130*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.129*** -0.140***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls at t=0 No No No No Yes No No Yes
Earnings in 1991 No No Yes No No No No No
Othersincome No No No Yes No No Yes No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.11 - - -
Observations 13729 13729 9729 12475 12130 13729 12475 12130
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant
at 10% level. The dependent variable is the log of hours worked per week. Additional controls include age and its square,
marital status, number of children less than 14 years old, education, blue-collar and public sector employment dummies,
year and region xed e¤ects. In xed e¤ects (FE) estimation time-invariant covariates are dropped.
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Table 7: Estimation results: hourly earnings
OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4) OLS(5) FE(6) FE(7) FE(8)
female*migr*after -0.131 -0.179** -0.064 -0.094 -0.062 0.036 0.051 0.082
(0.087) (0.073) (0.084) (0.072) (0.086) (0.069) (0.071) (0.076)
migr*after 0.050 0.314 0.759*** -0.302*** -0.242*** 0.434*** 0.345** 0.661***
(0.390) (0.270) (0.052) (0.065) (0.076) (0.147) (0.151) (0.215)
female*after 0.044** 0.053*** 0.014 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.048***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
female*migr -0.075 0.019 0.048 0.017 0.002
(0.069) (0.056) (0.052) (0.054) (0.066)
after 0.153*** 0.042 -0.067 0.040 0.053 -0.023 -0.017 -0.114***
(0.051) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043) (0.048) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
migr -0.042 0.015 -0.001 0.027 -0.009
(0.045) (0.040) (0.035) (0.039) (0.048)
female -0.073*** -0.151*** -0.090*** -0.116*** -0.157***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls at t=0 No No No No Yes No No Yes
Earnings in 1991 No No Yes No No No No No
Othersincome No No No Yes No No Yes No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.04 0.27 0.37 0.31 0.25 - - -
Observations 12461 12461 8984 12279 11088 12461 12279 11088
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant
at 10% level. The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings. Additional controls include age and its square, marital
status, number of children less than 14 years old, education, blue-collar and public sector employment dummies, year and
region xed e¤ects. In xed e¤ects (FE) estimation time-invariant covariates are dropped.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of the e¤ect
Annual income Weekly hours
OLS FE OLS FE
Married -0.669*** -0.150** -0.227*** -0.265***
(0.096) (0.076) (0.054) (0.070)
[9605] [9137]
Married -0.910*** -0.192** -0.318*** -0.142**
with children (0.119) (0.101) (0.060) (0.073)
[6679] [6369]
Married -0.453*** -0.157** -0.160*** -0.265***
before (0.106) (0.082) (0.064) (0.087)
[9459] [8856]
With children -0.615*** -0.227*** -0.243*** -0.235***
before (0.116) (0.090) (0.066) (0.064)
[8246] [7710]
Single -0.173 -0.097 -0.097 -0.042
(0.143) (0.132) (0.074) (0.065)
[3514] [3338]
Worked -0.392*** -0.302*** -0.227*** -0.266***
before (0.090) (0.079) (0.048) (0.056)
[11752] [12195]
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis, sample size - in brackets. *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant
at 5% level, * signicant at 10% level. Only the coe¢ cient on the third-level interaction in equation (1) is reported. Rows
dene the subpopulations for which the model is estimated. Additional controls in OLS include age and its square, university
degree, general schooling degree, vocational training (reference-apprenticeship), blue-collar worker, public sector employee,
year and region xed e¤ects (as well as others income in the equation for weekly hours). In xed e¤ects estimation (FE)
time invariant covariates are dropped.
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Table 9: The e¤ect of additional interactions
Annual income Weekly hours
OLS FE OLS FE
married*f*m*a -0.425*** -0.319*** -0.171*** -0.194**
(0.101) (0.119) (0.063) (0.084)
female*migr*after -0.181* -0.048 -0.102 -0.129
(0.106) (0.105) (0.064) (0.080)
kids*f*m*a -0.526*** -0.260** -0.184*** -0.078
(0.099) (0.111) (0.060) (0.074)
female*migrant*after -0.227*** -0.131 -0.133*** -0.213***
(0.088) (0.083) (0.050) (0.067)
married before*f*m*a -0.012 0.108 0.115*** 0.071
(0.096) (0.116) (0.045) (0.083)
female*migrant*after -0.473*** -0.280*** -0.248*** -0.266***
(0.097) (0.099) (0.046) (0.065)
Observations 13119 12475
hours for childcare*f*m*a -0.081*** -0.072*** -0.039*** -0.037***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.008) (0.010)
female*migrant*after -0.314*** -0.099 -0.121*** -0.168***
(0.094) (0.096) (0.046) (0.068)
Observations 10994 10566
othersinc*f*m*a -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.00004**
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00001) (0.00002)
female*migrant*after 0.001 0.024 -0.056 -0.178***
(0.086) (0.089) (0.046) (0.062)
Observations 12937 12475
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, *signicant at
10% level. "f*m*a" stands for the third-level interaction "female*migrant*after". "Hours for childcare" are reported hours
spent per weekday on childcare; "othersincome" stands for monthly income of other members of the household. Controls
include age and its square, married, number of kids less than 14 years old, university degree, general schooling degree,
vocational training (reference-apprenticeship), blue-collar worker, public sector employee, year and region xed e¤ects (as
well as others income in the equation for weekly hours). In xed e¤ects estimation (FE) time invariant covariates are
dropped.
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Table 10: The e¤ect in western Germany
Annual income Employment Weekly hours Hourly earnings
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
female*migr*after -0.074 0.247** -0.032 -0.074 0.069* 0.212*** -0.061 -0.136
(0.067) (0.119) (0.030) (0.064) (0.038) (0.072) (0.053) (0.085)
migr*after -0.010 0.052 0.023 0.006 -0.002 -0.013 -0.114*** 0.007
(0.048) (0.101) (0.021) (0.052) (0.025) (0.065) (0.041) (0.075)
female*after -0.063*** -0.019* 0.016** 0.014** -0.036*** -0.010 0.008 0.004
(0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
female*migr 0.263*** 0.015 0.033 0.058
(0.059) (0.026) (0.033) (0.045)
after -0.007 -0.095** -0.052*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.039 0.003 -0.011
(0.028) (0.048) (0.013) (0.026) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.047)
migr -0.070* -0.030* -0.004 0.040
(0.040) (0.017) (0.019) (0.032)
female -0.627*** -0.043*** -0.276*** -0.151***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
R2 0.30 - 0.14 - 0.27 - 0.22 -
Observations 28111 32377 26766 26378
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, *signicant at 10%
level. Controls include age and its square, married, number of kids less than 14 years old, university degree, general schooling
degree, vocational training (reference - apprenticeship), blue-collar worker, public sector employee (not for employment
equation), year and region xed e¤ects (as well as others income in equations for employment, hours and hourly wages).
In xed e¤ects estimation (FE) time invariant covariates are dropped.
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Table 11: Additional robustness checks
Annual income Employment Weekly hours Hourly earnings
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
A: controlling for household characteristics
female*migrant*after -0.456*** -0.239*** -0.062 0.030 -0.255*** -0.240*** -0.164** 0.028
(0.080) (0.073) (0.044) (0.048) (0.041) (0.052) (0.071) (0.069)
Observations 12937 17683 13451 12302
B: controlling for occupations
female*migrant*after -0.441*** -0.236*** -0.238*** -0.259*** -0.059 0.074
(0.080) (0.072) (0.042) (0.057) (0.070) (0.072)
Observations 12842 12215 12027
C: retaining commuters in stayersgroup
female*migrant*after -0.474*** -0.239*** 0.032 0.039 -0.220*** -0.246*** -0.094 0.051
(0.082) (0.074) (0.045) (0.049) (0.041) (0.056) (0.072) (0.071)
Observations 13119 15990 12475 12279
Note: robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, *signicant at 10%
level. Only the coe¢ cient on the third-level interaction is reported. Controls include age and its square, married, number
of kids less than 14 years old, university degree, general schooling degree, vocational training (reference - apprenticeship),
blue-collar worker, public sector employee (not for employment equation), year and region xed e¤ects (as well as others
income in equations for employment, hours and hourly wages in panels B and C). In xed e¤ects estimation (FE) time
invariant covariates are dropped. In panel A household characteristics include household size and log of monthly household
income, and the number of children is dropped. In panel B nine major occupational groups (ISCO88) are included (reference
- elementary occupations), and blue collar and public sector dummies are dropped. In panel C commuters are included in
stayersgroup.
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Figure 1: Flow (in thousands) of East-West migrants in Germany by gender, 1991-2004.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005.
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